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The Sounds of Music: First Movement 
 
LAWRENCE D. KIMMEL 
 
 
How we hear music clearly depends upon our intellectual capacities and 
education, upon concepts, analogies and expectations that we have 
inherited from a culture steeped in musical expression. Yet the under-
standing that we derive from this culture is manifest in our way of 
hearing, and not just our way of thinking about music. 
—Roger Scruton 
 
 In his essay "Understanding Music," Roger Scruton has argued for a 
nonreductionist approach to aesthetics, emphasizing the contextually rich 
language and grammar that structure discourse about various forms of art.   
This accords with Wittgenstein's series of "reminders" about the importance of 
finding philosophical footholds in ordinary language.  However refined artistic 
taste and aesthetic judgment may become, their fundamental source is in 
ordinary discourse about what surprises, pleases, and moves us.  In what 
follows I will try to amplify these remarks and map the outlines of a conceptual 
investigation of the grammar of musical understanding. I will be less interested 
in an account of how we hear music than in an examination of the idea that we 
hear music. 
 
 
I 
 
 There are of course many kinds and degrees of "understanding." In music, 
as elsewhere, understanding may and does result from study, analysis, practice, 
play, or simply being alive and listening. Before we get to the complexity of 
"understanding," however, we first need to look at looking and listening and 
seeing and hearing
1
. To understand musical understanding, we must initially 
sort out some "typical" questions and try to see what it is we are asking when 
we ask them.  Some obvious candidates are: What, if any, special kind of 
interest(s) do we take in an artwork or "object"? What is it to 
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take an artistic interest in any work or object? What are musical looking and 
listening? Clarity in responding to such questions depends, of course, on 
getting clear about contexts and contrasts. That is, what other "kinds" of 
looking, listening, and understanding is musical looking, musical listening, 
and musical understanding to be compared with and contrasted to? Given this 
concern, one relevant question is, What is it to listen to music rather than to 
sounds, or music rather than noise, or music rather than news? 
 Let's begin on the seemingly simplest seam of it, with the question, 
When do we listen to sounds? The answer is not "all the time."  This may be 
an answer to the question, When do we hear sounds? After all, it's a noisy 
world. But listening is something we do, not something that happens. In 
concert with Scruton's remark that "understanding music is a special case of 
intentional understanding"
2
 is the point that (musical) listening is a special 
case of intentional hearing.   We can listen with understanding—and 
sometimes not. We can also listen (but less plausibly, hear) with interest, 
concern, enjoyment, sympathy, anxiety—or not. To listen is to focus our 
attention—a kind of focused hearing—in a certain way or in various ways 
merely suggested above.  Consider only the complexity of meaning in the 
following ordinary complaint of a parent or lover or employer:  "Please listen 
to me!  You're not listening, you're not hearing what I say, not understanding 
what I mean." 
 Perhaps even in a noisy world it is misleading to say that what we hear all 
the time are sounds; or perhaps it's simply uninformative—what would it be to 
hear a nonsound?  What we hear are cars, voices, music, birds, radios, songs, 
bells, horns, wind, echoes, airplanes.  There is, in other words, a surface sense 
in which we hear things, not sounds.  If an insistent voice suggests that, 
speaking accurately, we hear the sounds things make, I will agree.  But 
"sounds-they-make" is a cultural phenomenon too complicated for mere  
ears.  Whatever else this involves, in the light of what we have already  
shown, this will be a matter of listening and understanding, not simply hearing.  
To say only, "I am hearing sounds" casts a strange sense on the ordinary matter 
and manner of hearing.  One seldom listens to sounds, sim- 
ply (not that one listens to sights or feels); one listens, rather, to people, to 
radios, rain, traffic, trains. . .  but to sounds?  Only when there is a game or a 
mystery of some sort—an uncommon absence of identification ("See if you can 
guess what sound this is...")—is it appropriate to say we listen to  
sounds.  The deep grammatical point to be noted here is that it takes a kind of 
phenomenological bracketing to talk this way sensibly.  I must make an  
effort to hear your voice as sound or to listen to my radio as sound.  The first-
order experience—what is, so to speak, present to mind—is listening to a 
complex order or structure of things.  But isn't this just quibbling, or just  
word games, as when one insists, "I'm not listening to the radio, I'm listening to 
the news?"  It may be objected that there is really no opposition here, 
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that we listen both to the radio, to the news, and to the sounds and that each is 
simply a different way of focusing on or talking about what is happening. 
Perhaps this is so, but "simply" won't do.  There is a complexity of experi-
ence and reference that needs sorting out, a whole range of language games 
that go with each of the above distinctions. For example, it is the hearing of 
the news of a stock market crash, of an invasion of a homeland, of a family 
member's death in an accident that results in the heart attack, the feeling of 
despair or outrage, not a hearing of sounds. Where, then, is one to focus 
attention, and why? 
 
 
II 
 
 In these opening remarks I have tried to clarify the direction that inquiry 
must take toward understanding what it is to hear music. The grammatical 
complexity of the root distinction between hearing and listening already 
suggests that the task of inquiry must be to open up and not close down the 
density of distinctions and choices that present themselves in the pursuit of 
musical understanding. This background orientation leads to a further ques-
tion: Is there some particular way of focusing, of attending, that it properly 
makes sense to call musical? What are we asking here? A prior and subsid-
iary question that must be asked is what it is we are focusing on when we 
focus "musically."  Is there a general sense or response to the question of 
what it is we are attending to when we listen to music? 
 It is not plausible that anyone, anytime, listening to any music attends to 
the same thing. To begin with, as we have already suggested, the "thing" in 
question is problematic. At a performance of Boris Godunov one may be lis-
tening to the aria, the voice, the orchestra, the chorus, the score, the language; 
one can and does, that is, listen to many things in listening to one thing. 
Attending a rare appearance in the United States and hearing Boris Cristov in 
the role, I may be listening—in listening to the music—to the remarkable 
resonance of the lower register of a great basso profundo in a bad hall, or to 
the surprising range and location of the tesitura of the voice, or to the 
unsettling contrast of his singing in Russian to the Italian of the chorus; and 
different persons in the audience may be listening to the same thing or not, all 
the while, with exceptions all listening to the opera. The "identity" of the 
aesthetic "object" is of course in this way itself problematic. In quite ordinary 
and other circumstances one may listen to a range of kinds of things—to a 
voice, or an orchestra, or a program, or a person, or a telegram, or a 
complaint. There is no exclusive or independently privileged first-order 
language of sound as such; this, too, is a matter of focus. "First-order 
language" can and does shift, depending on context, which in turn depends 
upon interest. 
 The shift in focus on hearing sound to hearing music is one of a whole 
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domain of discourse, a transposition in language games. Consider just the 
obvious differences in attending to the insipid drone of "elevator music," of 
"telephone-on-hold music," or the "top twenty-eight," or, perhaps by contrast, 
to the artistry of Segovia or Hendrix, Horowitz or Gould, Fischer-Discau or 
Billie Holliday; or, again in a different sense, to solo string or woodwind 
instruments, to a brass ensemble, to a chamber orchestra, to a cathedral organ, 
or to a bluegrass banjo. And these examples do not yet raise the complexity of 
musical form or cultural time and taste. In the latter case, we would need to 
attend further to the contrast of the compositional styles as well as the musical 
signatures of Mozart or Mahler, of Bach, Brahms, Bartok, or the Beatles. 
Musical listening or "attending to" is surely quite different in each of these 
cases. Things are made even more complicated when we consider whether 
what we are listening to is "live," recorded, telecast, broadcast, and so on. 
 Leaving aside questions of judgment—whether of beauty, burlesque, or 
the banal—consider what experiential differences are involved in listening to 
the acoustical guitar of Segovia or to the electronic guitar of Hendrix. This is a 
difference in worlds. In the contrasting voices of Fischer-Discau and Billie 
Holliday there is a cultural disparity not so difficult to mark between High 
German and Middle Harlem. Even so, and in some cases, to be able fully to 
attend musically to one may lead no further; lieder may not sound like music 
in Harlem, and the anguish of "Strange Fruit" may reach no ear in Hamburg. 
 A second subsidiary question to the one which begins this section is: What 
is it to listen to music rather than a series of sounds? This makes it seem as if 
we could simply set out a series of sounds that are utterly independent of 
musical sense. We will more profitably focus on "the first move" not of 
listening to a sound or series of sounds, but to music.  If we ask what it is to 
hear something as music rather than as a series of sounds, the obvious and 
appropriate concepts or words that rise to fill the gap left by this question are 
melody, harmony, and rhythm. These by themselves, however, do not explain 
anything. To hear a sequence of sounds merely, without inclusion in a field of 
musical understanding, remains just that, a sequence of sounds. 
 Is it possible to give a neutral description of a series of "musically neutral" 
sounds? Unless we simply make the sounds, any description other than "Sound 
1/Sound 2/Sound 3/Sound N" will carry (semantic) content. That is, any 
description beyond a series of numbers will suggest dramatic scoring.  The 
correlative point is that unless we already had a musical sense, such 
distinctions would not carry semantic import. Consider, for example, the 
following sound distinctions deliberately removed from a defining context of 
music:
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Jarring sounds / splintering/ muffled / scuffling/ high-pitched sound/ 
 
Does this ordinary "nonmusical" sequence already carry sufficient meaning to 
suggest an interpretation? The further inclusion of barest context shapes it 
more clearly: 
 
Suddenly there was a jarring noise, like a sharp object being struck against 
wood.  Then, a splintering sound, then muffled voices and scuffling.  Then 
a high-pitched sound, perhaps a scream, then silence.... After a while I fell 
asleep.  I don't know now whether it was a dream. 
 
 Here, at any rate, is a sequence of sounds, not music. However, within 
this sequence is a telling which, even lacking further detail or content, en-
courages an idea about the kind of interest we might take in the description: 
"What happened? Who did what to whom? Was the neighboring apartment 
broken into or not? Should I notify the police? Should I stay out of it? What is 
my responsibility? What kind of building have I moved into!" We would say 
perhaps that these kinds of questions indicate more than, or other than, 
musical interest; but is there a special class of such contrasting interests? 
 
 Here is a sequence of sounds no one would mistake for melody, although, 
by analogy, it is perhaps an orchestration of dramatic events. There is no 
musical interest yet, certainly no context in which it makes sense to speak of 
music. But could these sounds be so arranged as to be heard as music? Well, 
such sounds can be orchestrated; it depends on what the culture has come to 
regard through tradition, or is willing to accept in innovation, as the stuff of 
music. Within music history and in contemporary culture, music has been 
extended and expanded in just this way. (Some would say it has been so 
adulterated and corrupted.) What, for example, marks the musical distance 
between the bel canto of Bellini and the shrieks of Berg? Is music or melody 
"in the ear of the beholder"? It would make better sense to say that music is in 
the ear (and voice/mind/heart) of the culture. The field of hearing sound as 
music is set by the culture—the lebenswelt of understanding, part of the fabric 
of a social, shared sense. Music is not reducible as such to the raw phenomena 
(the physics and physiology) of mere sound. It is, in its first movement of 
hearing even, more than sound orchestrated or sound heard as orchestrated. 
Whatever is heard as music is already organized within a metaphorical 
framework of movement and structure (melody and harmony), and its 
existence as sound is marked off in such a way that the relationship is 
meaningful in time (rhythm). 
 What and how does this happen? How and when do we learn to "do" all 
this? Is it the individual mind that must organize sound this way into music? 
Surely not, or not simply so. In seeking a foundation for aesthetic theory, 
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one might be misled into imagining the necessity of a complex cognitive ac-
tivity, something that descriptively and factually happens, some procedure that 
one must do in one's head/mind/brain in order finally to hear music or melody. 
Listening to music is not, however, a matter of processing discrete bits of 
sense data. To think so is mistaken in a way detailed by Wittgenstein's 
criticism of the idea of seeing as the processing of visual sense data.
3
  Recall 
that on the sense-data theory, seeing has two operative levels: it is something 
one does after and with a process that first happens, to which one is subject. A 
"description" of the following sort was offered by Bertrand Russell
4
 to explain 
what must happen when one sees. Merely in looking and listening one 
receives data, which one must then convert, so to speak, into things. For the 
sense-data theorist, seeing an apple thus requires inference. 
 Without taking up the whole of it here, it is grammatically sensible to say, 
"I see the apple," but it is grammatically contrived or nonsensical to say, "I see 
red, round, smooth" and then make some sort of additional movement of 
synthetic inference and conclude that "this collection of data is probably an 
apple." This may happen—perhaps in a dark room, with mirrors, in a guessing 
game—but it would be the exception. We of course may be wrong in making a 
claim that "I see an apple" or "I hear a melody." We can also imagine a context 
that allows such a description of ordinary perception (i.e., of seeing colors, not 
things), but it would be the derivative exception, not the rule. 
 I may, for example, imagine those red, round, smooth objects scattered in 
the open field to be burnished stones and then be amazed to see a child pick 
one up and take a bite out of it; thus a stone becomes an apple. (The familiar 
analogue in the psychology of perception is that the rabbit becomes a duck.) I 
now see the objects for what they are, having been mistaken. But in ordinary 
circumstances, what I see (i.e., the basic units of the language of seeing) are 
apples, not reds and rounds; they are objects, not datums. So too, in hearing 
music, it is a melody I hear, not a sequence of sounds. In this most primary 
sense, musical understanding is something I bring to the experience, not, as in 
the analogy cited above, a process in which a datum is transformed by 
inference into a thing. 
 There is, finally, no one answer to any of the questions we have raised 
here, and the traditional kinds of answers have seemed to depend on the idea of 
a musically neutral description of sound. All sound has in it, as sound, the 
potential and sense of music. This is not to deny that there may be a 
"first-order" analysis. In the case of the apple it is arguable that the concepts 
"red, round, hard, smooth" are in some important "visual" sense "first order." 
But this cannot sensibly preclude an equally plausible analysis that insists that 
the "first-order" concepts appropriate to the apple are "skin, seeds, pulp, stem, 
core." Which is more basic, which are the constituants of 
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the experience of the apple? This cannot be answered without knowing more 
of what motivates the question. So too with music: the cultural phenomenon 
exists first in the "world of appearance," before any arrangement in 
representation or musical notation. 
 
 
III 
 
 The hearing of music is then, in its first movement of understanding, not a 
physiological or even psychological process but a cultural faculty or facility. It 
is misleading at the initial stage of analysis (the first move in the game of 
understanding music, melody, and tone) to say we hear sequences of sounds 
(datums of sense) that we then somehow spontaneously, magically, or meta-
phorically convert to melody and music. There are exceptions surely, where 
sound is indeterminate, as it were at a distance, we gradually come to dis-
tinguish the disturbance as music, as having a melodic, harmonic, or rhythmic 
character. So, too, in some elemental sense we no doubt gradually learn to hear 
sound as music within a culture and language in much the same way as we 
learn language itself: we simply come to hear sounds as words. This does not 
intend to dismiss the importance of specific questions that may be raised in the 
context of study. This is Wittgenstein's general point, of course, in the 
Investigations. If our minds, sense, and spirits remain alive, we continue to 
learn to hear in new, broader, and deeper ways which are also dependent in 
complex ways on cultural experience. We can and do move from the 
experience of the syncopated solo rhythms of the nursery rhyme to the lyrical 
movements of the ballet, to conversant voices of instruments in orchestral 
sections; we can move, and as a musically innovative culture have moved, 
from the tonal wholeness of major keys and harmonic scales to the dynamic 
structural tensions of minor keys and atonality, from the familiar reassuring 
tones of dramatic scoring of "classical" works to the distorted pitch of 
contemporary compositions. We learn to listen and hear in an incredibly 
complex way; we learn not only what to listen to, but what to listen for in a 
vast literature and field of music. And if we are fortunate and fascinated, we 
keep reaming, keep open to the life of sound and to the miracle of musical 
movement. 
 But what is it we ream, and how? In the most general terms, we learn as 
we grow from infancy to speak and listen and think and hear and feel and 
imagine without a set of directions; there is no clear agreed-upon theory which 
would begin to account for what is done, much less how it is done. So, too, it 
is in music. It is not as if we first learn to hear sound and then learn to hear 
music. It is plausible to say that children may not learn to hear sound at all. 
For example, when should we say the "occurrence" of sound first begins? To 
make the point in an extreme (absurd but experientially universal) way, 
consider for a moment the internal racket of the womb: the 
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stirring groan of organs going about their metabolic ritual, transforming en-
ergy; the strong, steady beat of an organic pump—different, too, in signaling 
deep sleep or sexual excitement, anxiety or exhaustion. On this account we 
can imagine a kind of Platonic cave game with sounding shadows in which the 
fetus spends her sightless time guessing the sounds and sense of passing tone 
and rhythms. Recall it was a major worry of Plato that the game of guessing 
shadows would bring such delight and reward that we would never leave the 
cave.
5
  And so we share, archetypally, the dark, sounding comfort of the 
womb, which may account later for the phenomenon that "music soothes a 
savage breast" and, less mythically, that the distressed child may be rocked to 
sleep by the steady beat of sound. 
 When does the "learning" of sights and sounds as such begin and how 
does it occur? These are not empiric questions, I think. Even so, patterning is 
something rational creatures do naturally; so much so that it is not clear, or 
perhaps even sensible, to think that there is a requisite theoretical base, a 
necessary or given ground. By using the word "naturally" here, I intend this 
whole example in the spirit of Wittgenstein's "remarks on the natural history 
of Man," and not in any reductive or regressive sense which would reintroduce 
the physiological as the root of experience, musical or otherwise. 
 Does our playfully uncovered idea that in the fetal stage the child-to-be 
''learns'' to hear long before it can possibly see mean that the most primitive 
form of human cognizance is aural rather than visual? What sort of question or 
claim is this? A nonsensical one, I think, and it may be instructive that it is so. 
It suggests that in musical understanding there may be no "first move." There 
may not be a datum within which music is found, out of which music is 
made—no "given" the transformation of which becomes music. Rather 
"hearing music" already depends on a broad cultural understanding, not to be 
reduced to a simple process of conversion or translation. We can, of course, 
distinguish, as we have herein suggested, the difference between sequence and 
sound, movement and music. We can show through plausible argument that 
sequence is not enough to account for melody. Indeed, the metaphor of 
movement is needed. But this just means that understanding music and 
accounting for the elementary grammar of it require an intelligible language, a 
complete language game, an already coherent form of life. 
 The result of our inquiry is clearly modest. All we have done thus far is to 
indicate the moveable boundaries of musical sense by showing that the basic 
unit of analysis is not sound per se or its sequence, but a tonal note and 
melody within a cultural context of being music. Nor is it clear that there must 
be some primitive experience of a "given," of isolated sounds that are 
somehow transposed to sequences, then metaphorically transformed to 
movement, and, finally, heard as notes of melody. 
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 We (already) hear music in the same way that we (already) see apples: that 
is, long before we can begin the anatomic analytic of conceptually isolating 
"red" and "round" and "smooth" and "sweet" and "hard" and "delicious," or, for 
that matter, "appealing," "symbolic," and "seductive." Likewise all the complex 
language of perceiving, appreciating, or "understanding"; the appearance of an 
apple comes much later than the first step of seeing "apple." A kind of 
functional counterpoint to any analytic theory of music, even the sensitive and 
sensible one Scruton offers, is a playful reminder of the sort we have tried to 
give here: that the audience prior to the prelude, indeed that the baby before 
birth, already has as part of its sensitivity, the movement and placement of 
sound, the wonderful, frightening, reassuring rhythm of life, the rudiments of 
musical understanding of a resonant/dissonant world. However traumatic the 
advent of first light and air and the rude backsides slap of the attending 
physician's baton, the child already has, we may surmise, some remembrance 
on which to draw in the birthing of her own rhythm in a new key and time. Just 
so does the musical novitiate have the cultural sensibility to pick up and take in 
full measure the sounds of music. So then are we claiming that the child-to-be 
listens to the chamber music of the mother's internal organs? No such claim is 
in order. Still.... 
 It is tempting to break off just here. This would leave it where things ac-
tually begin, open to conceptual boundaries set by the simple contextual 
imperative of making and discovering sense. We can, now far from the trauma 
of our beginnings, ask all sorts of questions and make all sorts of distinctions, 
some more helpful or astounding or mysterious and provocative than others. 
What is it we don't know about listening to music? What is it we wish to make 
clear to ourselves? Why are we asking the question? It was Wittgenstein's sound 
counsel that, especially in philosophy, one ought to keep this last question 
within ready recall. 
 
 
IV 
 
 Have we provided a basis for moving on to the representative questions 
we set out at the beginning of this article? What is it to take an interest in mu-
sic? What do we mean by musical interest? Is this a separate phenomenon as 
well as an analytically distinct category? On the ordinary-language model we 
have pursued, we can set out examples of contrasting interests: (1) musical 
interest in contrast to economic interest (Will the record sell? Can we market 
it?), (2) musical interest in contrast with moral interest (Won't this lyric or 
performance seduce every Lucy to seek out diamonds in the sky or encourage 
young musicians to bite bats?),
6
 (3) musical interest in contrast to martial 
interest (We require the sounding brass and stirring sounds that will lead the 
ranks of death to their calling in battle), (4) musical interest in contrast 
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to political interest (What heroic strains will overcome the limp image of 
presidential wimpery?). Are all of these concerns about musical products or 
activity not musical? We can perhaps make the case either way, but we need 
here, as before, a broad cultural field of common understanding and ordinary 
language to do so. 
 It is in a similar way that the familiar (Kantian) model of aesthetic theory 
attempts to purify categories appropriate to art and so defines aesthetic interest 
as an interest in a visual or auditory phenomenon "for its own sake" —a kind 
of first-order interest of reflection. And once again, a case may be made here—
for example, this may be understood as a proposal that we must first discuss 
perception as a phenomenon (music) before we can assess or predict its 
usefulness and impact or effect in an economic, political, or moral context. 
 Believing this, we may with Nietzsche, following Schopenhauer, support 
the view that aesthetic or artistic engagement with the world is prior or primary 
to all else. We can submit the credible notion that we register and respond, 
assimilate and appropriate the shapes of color and the movement of sound 
before any imperatives or prescriptions of form and measure direct our 
management of it. This seems to be, however, a different, metaphysical 
question: What is it to be grounded in primitive experience, to become aware 
of the world as such? But even if we locate our interest in "experience" or 
"world," there is already a cultural structure, mirrored and moored in our 
shared language, within which our understanding moves. Whatever our 
response, we can only either describe or propose how it is we wish to use the 
concepts "musical," "artistic," "interest," and so forth. This description, in turn, 
depends wholly on the grammar of the concepts, their use in the shared 
language games of understanding music or painting. The decision that informs 
any proposal of what musical interest is "really," or the concern such a focus 
betrays, depends on this: at the very heart of perception, of sense and 
sensitivity no less than in judgment and theory, is metaphor—or rather, a quite 
ordinary culturally complex and fictive language of imagination that is 
everywhere dense and which is an integral part of normal sensibility. 
 We can, when we choose, sort out, cut up, paste on from the vantage of 
myriad points, a sensible account of art, just as of science, of experience, of 
world, of time and space, of meaning and imagination. Is one point more 
privileged than another, more true or more real? From what point, then, would 
that question be answered? There is an incredible richness to the fabric of our 
cultural lives, the acknowledgment of which recommends to aesthetics a 
moveable focus, not stationary perspective. 
 Even to focus as we have on musical understanding may make it seem as 
if the required task of musical aesthetics is to develop a theory to solve 
puzzles. But which puzzles? They seem endless, and for every puzzle there  
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are not too few but too many pieces. Metaphors within metaphors, stacked upon 
metaphors, all open to the interpretation of philosophy. Just as one cannot perform 
"music in general"—there is no such thing, its enterprise nonsense—so is there no 
understanding "music in general." Aside from grammatical tuning of the 
instruments of inquiry, this makes of musical aesthetics a series of concrete 
investigations usefully limited to particular cases. If this in turn seems to diminish 
the interest and impact of aesthetic theory, it also empowers and enriches musical 
activity. 
 To mark and make conceptual distinctions between sound and music, 
sequence and movement, notes and tones, pitch and contrapuntal melody is one 
among many ways to remark that musical understanding, even in its infancy, is a 
cultural as well as cognitive task. The moral of the story about music and art is 
that one learns to love the puzzling process as much as coherent solutions. 
 Finally, it may be important to remind ourselves that music is surely as much 
about being moved as about movement, as much about surprise, excitement, joy, 
suspense, and sorrow as about understanding—which is not to say these are 
exclusive. The genius of art is in the poesis of its making and remaking, its 
creation and renewal. We have discussed only beginnings, first movements 
listening to music, which both presume and promote understanding. There remain 
open all the ensuing movements in which music moves to mark the fullness of 
time. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1.  I use this locution in the sense of Wittgenstein's counsel in the Blue Book and 
the Philosophical Investigations, "Don't think—look" (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philo- 
sophical Investigations [New York: Macmillan, 1953], sec. 1, p. 66). 
2.  Roger Scruton, The Aesthetic Understanding (London: Methuen, 1983), p. 78. 
3. See Wittgenstein's discussion of perception and process in Philosophical 
Investigations, sec. 11, p. xi. 
4.  The simplest account is provided in Bertrand Russell's The Problems of 
Philosophy (New York Oxford University Press, 1959), chap. 1. 
5. Plato, Republic, Book VII. 
6. While the Beatles reference is likely to be familiar, perhaps Ozzie Osborn's 
early concert antic is not. 
 
